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BAR BRIEFS
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
USURY LAWS--AUTOMOBILE FINANCING
March 6, 1947




Re: State v. Murphy Finance Company
(Leo Dinsen, Defendant).
This will acknowledge your letter of March 5, 1947, concerning the
above criminal action.
This action involves a charge of usury under the penalty provisions
of section 47-1409 of the 1943 Revised Code. The facts as disclosed by your
letter are as follows:
On October 28, 1946, one Andrew L. Schaffer, borrowed money from
the Murphy Finance Company in the sum of $178.00. He gave as security
for the repayment of this sum a chattel mortgage on a car in the sum of
$178.00. The Murphy Finance Company insisted on insurance on the car
against loss by fire, lightning and transportation, and theft. This insurance
cost $8.00 and was actually purchased from a local agent. The borrower
actually received $170.00 in cash.
Mr. Schaffer stated that he had an understanding or agreement with
the Murphy Finance Company to pay $27.35 per month for a period of 8
months to liquidate the loan, or a 'total of $218.80.
The mortgage describes the note for $178.00, dated October 28, 1946
and due June 28, 1947, and lists it in the amount of $178.00. Nothing is
said in the note or in the mortgage as to interest. The insurance policy
purchased for $8.00 states that "under coverages, single interest $218.80."
It also refers to "encumbrance" $218.80. In other words, the insurance policy
would seem to bear out the actual understanding and agreement as given
by Mr. Schaffer. Mr. Schaffer has paid one payment of $27.35 which was
accepted by Mr. Dinsen.
At the preliminary hearing of the above action, the original papers
were disclosed. The note for $178.00 shows no reference to interest. The
inference would be that it does not draw interest and that it would not be
enforceable except for its face of $178.00.
Attached to this note on a separate sheet of paper with a perforation
between the actual note and this other paper is a document which reads
as follows:
"This is not a note and Bismarck, North Dakota, October
is not enforceable 28, 1946.
I/We agree to pay to the Murphy Finance
Company at the place designated by them, at
my/our option, both as to time and amount,
the sum of $40.80, without interest.
(Signed) Andrew L. Schaffer.
Note: In no event shall or will
any payment be paid, received or
applied hereon, until -after any
legal obligation to the herein
named payee has been paid in full."
Under the facts as given, the question arises whether or not the
defendant is guilty of a criminal violation of the usury law of this state.
The argument of the defendant at the preliminary hearing was to the effect
that there was no agreement to pay interest and that the borrower was
liable for $178.00, and upon payment of the same was entitled to demand
the cancellation of his note and the satisfaction of his mortgage, and that
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he was not in any way liable for the $40.80 or any part thereof except
at his option as to time and amount. In other words, it was the contention
of the defendant that the $40.80 document was not enforceable against
the defendant and that consequently there was no violation of the usury
law 'by the defendant.
Under out statute, section 47-1411 of the 1943 Revised Code, any
person, whether in his own individual right or as the agent, servant, or
representative of any individual, firm, corporation, or association, who
shall take, receive, reserve, or charge a usurious rate of interest, in
addition to being liable for the penalti es and forfeitures specified in the
preceding section, is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ninety days, or by a fine
of not more than three hundred dollars, or by both. Under the document
calling for $40.80, did the defendant reserve or charge what amounts to
a usurious rate of interest? The borrower, Mr. Sc'haffer, has paid only
$27.35, which, under the theory of the defendant, must be applied on the
principal of $178.00. The defendant, therefore, has not taken nor received
a usurious rate of interest. Has he reserved or charged a usurious rate
of interest? It would appear that he has not. Since there is no enforceable
contract against the borrower for the payment of the $40.80, the defendant
has not reserved or charged a usurious rate of interest on the transaction
involved. He has by a clever scheme apparently avoided the consequences
of the penalty provisions of the usury statute. But it appears that Mr.
Schaffer at no time was legally bound to pay this $40.80, and in fact the
instrument he signed clearly states that he agrees to pay to the Murphy
Finance Company at his option as to both time and amount. In other
words, if he did pay any part or portion of the $40.80, he did so entirely
on a voluntary 'basis. He had signed no document imposing upon him a
legal and enforceable obligation. Since the document calling for the $40.80
was not a legal and binding contract, the loan was not usurious and the
penalty provisions of the usury statute have not been transgressed.
Our supreme court, in the case of Weicker v. Stavely, 14 N. D. 278,
held that there must have been an agreement to pay the excessive charge.
Here the agreement negatives the obligation to pay. So it is my opinion
that under the facts as stated the defendant has cleverly avoided the
consequences of the criminal penalty for usury. I believe that under the
arrangement, Schaffer, upon payment of the $178.00, may demand cancel-
lation of his note and satisfaction of the mortgage, and that-if he never
pays any part or portion of the $40.80, the Murphy Finance Company
cannot enforce it against him, and since it cannot enforce it against him,
it must follow that it has not violated the usury statute criminally.
Assuming that Mr. Schaffer had paid the entire amount of $218.80,
which apparently he agreed informally to pay, although the written
documents do not bear out that agreement except by inference, the situa-
tion might be a violation of the usury statute, particularly section 47-1410
of the 1943 Revised Code, and might subject the defendant to civil liability
for usury. It will be noted that under that statute, taking, receiving,
reserving, or charging of a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the
laws of this state relative to usury shall be deemed a forfeiture of the
entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with
it or which has been agreed to be paid thereon, and in addition thereto,
a forfeiture of twenty-five percent of the principal thereof. Furthermore,
in case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom
it has been paid or his legal representative may recover back twice the
amount of interest thus paid, together with twenty-five percent of the
principal from the person taking or receiving the same, or offset twice
the amount of such interest against any indebtedness which the person
who paid the same owes to the party receiving such usurious interest.
In other words, under the civil liability for usury, the actual taking or
receiving of what amounts to usurious rate of interest might be the basis
for a civil liability. In this connection, since the borrower has not paid
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more than $27.35, and since that amount must necessarily be applied on
the principal obligation of $178.00, the civil liability statute for usury is
not applicable. If he had, however, paid the entire $218.80, it is my thought
that the Murphy Finance Company might have been liable under the
civil liability statute for usury. In the case of Wood v. Cuthbertson, 3 N. D.
328, 21 N.W. 3, our court held that when illegal interest has been stipulated
for, and not paid, then only the principal without interest can be recovered.
It is, therefore, the opinion of this office that the transaction referred
to in your letter is not of such a nature as to enable the state to maintain
successfully a criminal action against the defendant under the penalty
provisions of the usury law. The civil liability is another matter if the
$218.80 had been fully paid.
The scheme used in the transaction of the Murphy Finance Company
with Schaffer is contrary to the principles of equity, and while it is not












I received your letter of March 15, 1947, in which you request an opinion
concerning your duties under chapter 46-03 of the 1943 Revised Code, and
particularly sections 46-0310 to 46-0315, inclusive, in view of the enact-
ment of Senate Bill 217, amending and reenacting section 46-0311 of the
1943 Revised Code.
Section 46-0311, as amended by Senate Bill 217, provides that "the
secretary of state shall correct proof and supervise the publication of the
laws in a manner and form prescribed by the legislative research commit-
tee, correlating each year's laws with the session laws of preceding legis-
lative assemblies and the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943. He shall
secure a copyright of the session laws of each session of the legislative
assembly before the same are distributed, for the exclusive use and benefit
of the state, the procurement of such copyright to be printed properly in
each volume of said session laws."
Senate Bill 217 does not take effect until July 1, 1947. It does not
provide any appropriation for the payment of the expense that will be
involved in the correlation and publication of the laws of the special legis-
lative session of 1944 and of the 1945 session with the 1943 Revised Code.
I understand that you have funds available only for the purpose of publish-
ing the popular and authenticated edition of the 1947 Session Laws.
In view of the provisions of Senate Bill 217, the question arises
whether it is necessary for you, as secretary of state, to publish both the
popular and the official and authenticated editions of the Session Laws
of 1947 as provided by sections 46-0312 and 46-0314 of the 1943 Revised
Code.
It is quite evident to me that you must publish the popular edition
of the 1947 Session Laws as provided by section 46-0312 of the 1943 Revised
Code. It also appears that if and when the legislative research committee
attempts to correlate the laws of the special session of 1944 and of the
sessions of 1945 and 1947 with the 1943 Revised Code that you are required
merely to correct the proof and supervise the publication of such laws and
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to secure a copyright thereof before the same is distributed and see that
such copyright is plainly printed in each volume of said laws. Since no
funds are available for the publication of the correlation of these laws
with the Revised Code of 1943, it is apparent that if this is to be done
the legislative research committee must provide the funds to pay the
expenses of the publication of same, if any funds are available to the
legislative research oommittee for that purpose. It is also apparent that it
is up to the legislative research committee to arrange for the correlation
of these laws and for their publication. You are merely to correct the proof
and supervise the publication.
It is important for the officials of the state and the courts that the
official and authenticated edition of the 1947 Session Laws be available
to them as soon as possible and on or before July 1, 1947, so that they
may have ready access to an official publication of the 1947 Session
Laws. It is up to the legislative research committee to take the initiative
under Senate Bill 217, and you are merely to correct the proof and supervise
the publication of the laws when the work is undertaken by the legislative
committee, and as there is no specified date when this work must be
done, or commenced, by the legislative research committee, it appears to
me that you must proceed to publish the official and authenticated copy
of the 1947 Session Laws as provided by section 46-0314 of the 1943
Revised Code. It is conceivable that the legislative research committee
might take the best part of a year to properly correlate the laws of the
special session of 1944 and the session laws of 1945 and 1947, and that,
therefore, it would not be sufficient to merely print 2000 copies of the
popular edition of the 1947 Session Laws as provided by section 46-0312
of the 1943 Revised Code. Orderly government procedure requires that
the officials charged with the administration and enforcement of the laws
of the state have access to an official and authenticated edition of such
laws as soon as possible, and since Senate Bill 217 does not refer to section
46-0314 nor repeal it, it sees to me that Senate Bill 217 is not in conflict
with your official duties under section 46-0314 of the 1943 Revised Code,
and that you should proceed as soon as convenient to publish the official
and authenticated edition of the 1947 Session Laws, so that all of the
officials of the state and the courts may have the use of same. Further-
more, there is no legislative intent to be gathered from Senate Bill 217 to
the effect that the correlation of the laws therein provided shall be and
is a substitute for the publication of the official and authenticated edition
of the 1947 Session Laws. If that had been the intent of the legislative
assembly, then reference could have been made to section 46-0314 and the
same repealed. Furthermore, no one can tell when the correlation of the
laws of, the special session of 1944 and of the sessions of 1945 and 1947
may be accomplished and become available to. all officials, both local and
state. Therefore, to avoid confusion and to procure for the use of all
officials as soon as possible an authenticated edition of the 1947 Session
Laws, I deem that you should proceed to print and distribute the same as
you have done in the past.
Accordingly, it is the opinion of this office that you proceed under
the terms of sections 46-0310 to 46-0315 of the 1943 Revised Code, to print
both the popular and authenticated editions of the 1947 Session Laws,
and that if and when the legislative research committee decides to operate
under the provisions of Senate Bill 217, that you correct the proof and
supervise the publication of the laws of the special session of 1944 and
the regular sessions of 1945 and 1947, as therein provided, as it appears
that the correlation of these laws with the 1943 Revised Code is left to
the legislative research committee, and the funds for the printing and
publication thereof must be furnished by the committee, if available, as
no legislative provision now exists for the purpose of defraying the expense





SENATE BILL 151-HEIRSHIP PROCEEDINGS
March 21, 1947




This will acknowledge your letter of March 14, 1947, in which you
state that you have received a copy of Senate Bill 151 regarding the
collection of filing fees in district and probate courts. I note that you
take the position that heirship proceedings do not come within the provis-
ions of this law.
Section 5 of the act, amending section 27-0740 of the 1943 Revised
Code, reads as follows:
"Before a petition for letters testamentary, of administration, or
guardianship is filed in a county court of this state, the petitioner, or
someone on his behalf, shall pay a filing fee of seven dollars and fifty
cents into the county treasury of the county in which the court is located."
Section 6 of the act, amending section 27-0741 of the 1943 Revised
Code, insofar as is pertinent, reads as follows:
"When a filing fee for an estate or for a guardianship is paid to
the treasurer of the proper county, he shall execute therefor duplicate
receipts one of which shall be filed with the county auditor and one with
the judge of the county court. * * * "
The question arises as to whether or not under the terms of these
two amendments an heirship proceeding deals with an estate. In the past,
the county courts have collected the same filing fee for the filing of a
petition for heirship as were collected for filing of letters testamentary
or letters of administration.
Section 27-0706 of the 1943 Revised Code states:
"The county court of a county shall have jurisdiction to take the proof
of a will and to grant letters testamentary, to grant letters of administra-
tion, or to determine heirship, as the case requires, if:
1. The decedent at the time of his death was a'resident of such
county, whether his death happened there or elsewhere;
2. There is property within such county which remains unadministered
and if the decedent at the time of his death was not a resident of this
state, no matter where the death occurred; or
3. The application therefor was first made in such county and if
the jurisdiction as defined in the preceding subsection of this section might
be in two or more counties."
It is apparent that the jurisdiction of the county court to entertain
heirship proceedings is on the same basis as its jurisdiction to deal with
letters of administration, letters testamentary, and guardianship. Heirship
proceedings are a probate matter and in the determination of the heirship
proceedings the county court makes a finding as to who the heirs are and
the shares to which each heir is entitled under the law of succession in the
property of the decedent.
On the basis of the custom of the county courts throughout the state,
as far as I have been able to determine, no distinction has been made
between an heirship proceeding and other probate proceedings as far as
the filing fee was concerned, and although section 27-0740 of the 1943
Revised Code does not specifically mention heirship proceedings, it has
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been interpreted to include them and filing fees have been charged on the
same basis for heirship proceedings as other probate proceedings.
Accordingly, it is my opinion that heirship proceedings are within the
terms of sections 5 and 6 of Senate Bill 151, and that you should charge










Mr. Harold D. Arnold




This will acknowledge your letter of April 9, 1947, with reference to
Senate Bill 151 of the 1947 session. You want to know whether the filing
fee of $7.50 provided by subsection 1 of section 11-1704 of the 1943 Revised
Code, as amended by section 3 of Senate Bill 151, should be charged in
divorce actions, quieting title actions, discharges of old mortgages, trusts,
deposit actions. and adoptions.
Undoubtedly the $7.50 filing fee should be charged in the filing of
divorce actions and quieting title actions. I do not believe it should be
charged in ex parte proceedings dealing with the discharges of old mort-
gages.
You will note that subsection 1 of section 11-1704 of the 1943 Revised
Code was the only subsection amended. Accordingly, it must have been
the intent of the legislative assembly to leave the fees enumerated in
subsection 2 to 22 of that section the same as they have always been.
Subsection 21 specifically states that "for all services in adoption proceed-
ings, three dollars." The three dollar filing fee has always been charged
in adoption matters as far as I can determine. Subsection 22 states that
"for all services in proceedings for deposit in court, three dollars."
Accordingly, a $3.00 filing fee charged for deposits is the same as it always
has been.
I am not entirely clear as to what you mean by trusts and accordingly
this opinion does not cover trusts at all. If you will explain further what
you mean by trusts, I shall be glad to go into that matter.
It is the opinion of this office that Senate Bill 151 does not change
the filing fees set forth in subsections 21 and 22, dealing with adoption
proceedings and for proceedings for deposits in court. Senate Bill 151
covers only the filing fee in what constitutes an action such as divorce
cases, quieting title cases, and other cases involving civil remedy. All the
other fees enumerated in section 11-1704 of the 1943 Revised Code remain
as they have always been.
Yours very truly,
NELs G. JOHNSON
Attorney General.
